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“Nothing is at last sacred but the integrity of your own mind.”-Ralph Waldo
Emerson
“To understand the immeasurable, the mind must be extraordinarily quiet.” Jiddu Krishnamurti
I. SCIENCE FICTION TO REALITY.
Cybernetic technology has now entered the commander’s brain. 1 In a viral
online video produced by Naval Weapons Station China Lake, a hive of mindcontrolled drones acts as a single organism upon intuitive command of a human
operator by reading and interpreting his brain signals—the hive of drones were
shown to support traditional military tactics by adapting to the users’ tactics,
predicting his intent. 2 As interesting as this new technology may be, there was
no discussion as to the culpability or liability of the operator should something
go wrong (although some organizations voiced concerns). 3
This type of technology and its ability to enter the brain is not limited in its
development to the military. For instance, Elon Musk’s announcement of a new
iteration of a wireless implants, produced by Neuralink, allows the brain to
directly interface with digital devices, serving as a realization of previous
“cyberpunk” technology. 4 Neuralink’s technology, however, remains immature,

1 Cybernetics, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/cybernetics (last visited May 17, 2021) (defining “Cybernetics” as
“the science of communication and control theory that is concerned especially with the
comparative study of automatic control systems [such as the nervous system and brain and
mechanical-electric communication systems]”).
2
Dep’t of Def., The Drone Swarm, YOUTUBE (May 25, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0RHmA5eH-d4; see also Nita Farahany, LENS 2018:
Complexity & Security, YOUTUBE (Feb. 23, 2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GS1IOjME5mA (Professor Farahany’s presention at
Duke’s Center on Law, Ethics and National Security (LENS) annual national security
conference).
3
See Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Watch the Pentagon’s New Hive-Mind-Controlled Drone
Swarm in Action, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/01/10/watch-the-pentagonsnew-hive-mind-controlled-drone-swarm-in-action/; Sam Bocetta, What Are the Security
Implications of Elon Musk’s Neuralink?, CSO ONLINE (Aug. 1, 2019),
https://www.csoonline.com/article/3429361/what-are-the-security-implications-of-elonmusks-neuralink.html.
4
See Adam Rogers, Neuralink Is Impressive Tech, Wrapped in Musk Hype, WIRED
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with many limitations such as the brain’s natural and intolerable environment to
foreign objects placed within it, physiological effects to the human brain, and
resiliency in its operability. 5 These capabilities, developed by the private and
public sectors, may be present in future kinetic combat action. 6
The advent of these technologies raises serious legal questions in the context
of accountability of use in combat operations where matters of life and death are
inevitable. Legal tradition provides that actions which have kinetic affects are
imparted on the humans who make them. 7 It is essential to a functional civilized
society that humans are held accountable if such actions resulting in kinetic
affects breach established legal regimes of liability and criminality. 8 This
standard applies regardless of whether such actions are intentional or
unintentional. 9 This is because the taking of life is primarily a human endeavor;
regardless of the tool or platform, the decision point rests with a human. 10 The
mental standards established by these legal regimes hold humans accountable
due to the evolutionary concept of scienter, which require a requisite awareness
of a given situation and a positive act to resolve it. 11 In other words, humans act
with a level of control over their mental state to make such decisions in which
they can foresee a consequence. 12
Nowhere is the concept of accountability and culpability more important than

(Sept. 4, 2020), https://www.wired.com/story/neuralink-is-impressive-tech-wrapped-inmusk-hype/.
5
See id.
6
See, e.g., Greg Allen, Understanding AI Technology, JOINT A.I. CTR. (Apr. 2020),
https://www.ai.mil/docs/Understanding%20AI%20Technology.pdf (The DoD AI Strategy
defines AI as “. . . the ability of machines to perform tasks that normally require human
intelligence. . . . This definition includes decades-old DoD AI, such as aircraft autopilots,
missile guidance, and signal processing systems. . . . Though many AI technologies are old,
there have been legitimate technological breakthroughs over the past ten years that have
greatly increased the diversity of applications where AI is practical, powerful, and useful.”).
7
See LARRY ALEXANDER, OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW, 819–20, 822 (Jules Coleman et al. eds., 2002).
8
See id. at 815–22.
9
See id. at 823.
10 See Alan L. Schuller, At the Crossroads of Control: The Intersection of Artificial
Intelligence in Autonomous Weapon Systems with International Humanitarian Law, 8
HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 379, 388–89 (2017).
11 See ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 823–31 (“In order to be a culpable act, an act must
be voluntary. If that were not the case…there would be no reason to exempt [a person] from
criminal liability. A separate requirement that a voluntary act be proved is included within
the requirement that a culpable act be proved”); see also Scienter, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (2nd ed. 1910) (defining the word as “knowingly”).
12 See Yavar Bathaee, The Artificial Intelligence Black Box and The Failure of Intent
and Causation, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 890, 906, 912 (2018).
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in matters of unlawfully causing death. 13 In war, death is inevitable. 14 The
concept of accountability and culpability for unlawful death in armed conflict is
found in the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), which holds commanders or other
superiors accountable for their own actions, as well those actions committed by
troops under their charge that are not in compliance with established limitations
and prohibitions on unlawful death. 15 This culpability and accountability regime
is extended to platforms and weapons through command and control systems
that resemble traditional human-to-human control; this is especially true where
there are well-defined and static targets, clear objectives, a structured operational
environment, and an uninterrupted or unaltered communication and execution
of orders. 16 This LOAC concept is known as respondeat superior (also known
as command responsibility). 17
Generally, LOAC’s primary purpose is meant to mitigate the destructive
results of armed conflict, as well as the impacts on those who are not participants
in such armed conflict. 18 LOAC achieves this through a myriad of signed
agreements and normative, customary behaviors. 19 The general principles
provided for destructive actions are that targets may be acquired, targeted, and
destroyed if they meet criteria of being a military necessity; they are distinctively
13 Thomas E. Ricks, What Ever Happened to Accountability?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct.
2012), https://hbr.org/2012/10/what-ever-happened-to-accountability.
14 Id.
15 See GARY SOLIS, THE L. OF ARMED CONFLICT: INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. IN WAR 417–
18 (Cambridge Univ. Press ed., 2nd ed. 2016); TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INT’L L.
APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS, INT’L GRPS. OF EXPERTS AT THE INVITATION OF THE
NATO COOP. CYBER DEF. CTR. OF EXCELLENCE 396–97 (Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul
eds., 2017) [hereinafter “TALLINN MANUAL 2.0”].
16 See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 417–18; see also Russell Buchan & Nicholas Tsagourias,
Autonomous Cyber Weapons and Command Responsibility, 96 INT’L. L. STUD. 645, 648–49
(2020). (“[Culpability] may be possible when [autonomous weapons] are used in clearly
defined and well-structured operational environments against pre-planned and stable targets.
However, where an [autonomous weapon] is deployed into a complex and evolving
operational environment and has the capacity to make dynamic targeting decisions, it cannot
be said that the commander intended the commission of a war crime, that he or she had
knowledge that it would occur, or that he or she assisted in its commission.”).
17 See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 417–18.
18 See THE JAG LEGAL CTR. & SCH., 2020 OPERATIONAL L. HANDBOOK 9 (U.S. Army,
Micah Smith et al. eds., 2020).
19 Salahudin Ali, Coming to a Battlefield Near You: Quantum Computing, Artificial
Intelligence, & Machine Learning’s Impact on Proportionality, 18 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L.
1, 4–5 (2020) (stating that, “In war, [] principles and standards of practice are governed by a
complex set of normative behavior and signed agreements reflected in the law of armed
conflict and customary international law”); see also Maj. Aaron L. Jackson & Col. Kristin
D. Kuenzli, Something to Believe In: Aligning The Principle Of Honor With the Modern
Battlefield, 6 NAT’L SEC. L.J. 35, 41 (2018) (stating that, “[LOAC] is not a singular work of
art, but rather, a puzzle formed by hundreds of individual pieces of international and
domestic law”).
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military in nature; destruction is proportionate in regard to actors and objects not
involved in the conflict; such destruction does not result in unnecessary
suffering; and targeting and destruction is conducted with a level of honor.20
These principles are used as a guide to ensure that a commander or other
superiors’ decisions to take action, or the ordering of subordinates to take action
which results in the loss of life, are based upon more than speculation, bias,
recklessness, or in worst circumstances, a superfluous quest for death. 21 Indeed,
many cases have demonstrated the proposition that commanders will not escape
criminal liability for their own actions, nor will they escape liability for those
actions conducted by subordinates they control when there is a failure of
accountability for actions seen or unforeseen which violate the LOAC. 22
As with any discipline, emerging technology serves as a disrupter. 23 An
example of this can be found in the evolving nature of warfare, which now
includes information operations, cyber operations, cybersecurity, use of
autonomous and semi-autonomous systems, robotics, and many other
developing aspects. 24 Recently, such discussion has focused on the role of
human decision- making in the deployment of emerging technologies and as to
what role humans should play within the decision cycle of autonomous
platforms who act as agents or extensions of a decision maker. 25 The discussion
is now more appropriately focused on cerebral and neurological process of
decision-making reserved for humans and one emerging technology’s ability to
interfere or control such decision-making capacity known as Brain-ComputerInterfacing (BCI). 26 BCI enables users to externally and spatially interact with
Ali, supra note 19, at 5–6.
Id. at 6–7; Michael N. Schmitt & Jeffrey S. Thurnher, “Out of the Loop”:
Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Law of Armed Conflict, 4 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 231,
231–33, 253–58 (2013).
22 See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 427–33 n. 56–86 (“Respondeat superior is a broad
concept, but its reach is not unreasonable. It must be accentuated that command
responsibility is all about dereliction of duty. [The point is that] [t]he commander is held
accountable for his own act [or omission], rather than incurring ‘vicarious liability’ for acts’
for acts . . . of subordinates.”).
23 Ali, supra note 19, at 1–2, 4 (2020).
24 See ANDREW FEICKERT ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., U.S. GROUND FORCES ROBOTICS
AND AUTONOMOUS SYS. AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONG. 16
(2018); see also Lt. Col. Wilson C. Blythe Jr. & Lt. Col. Luke T. Calhoun, How We Win the
Competitions for Influence, 99 MIL. REV. 37, 41, 45–46 (2019).
25 See Schuller, supra note 10, at 379, 386, 388; see also Buchan & Tsagourias, supra
note 16, at 645, 648–50 (discussing the concept known as “humans in the loop”).
26 Alexandre Gonfalonieri, A Beginner’s Guide to Brain-Computer Interface and
Convolutional Neural Networks, TOWARDS DATA SCI. (Nov. 25, 2018),
https://towardsdatascience.com/a-beginners-guide-to-brain-computer-interface-andconvolutional-neural-networks-9f35bd4af948 (noting that other nomenclature exists
regarding BCI neural-control interface [NCI]; Mind-machine interface [MMI]; direct neural
interface [DNI]; or Brain-machine interface [BMI]).
20
21

6

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

[Vol. 29.2

computers and tools by means of brain-activity only, which are measured,
processed, and controlled by a variety of technologies. 27 With the complexity of
the system architecture, its use of artificial intelligence algorithms, its use of
machine learning, and its signals acquisition processing, the discussion now
shifts focus as to what place platforms take within a human’s decision cycle as
a cybernetic extension used to control subordinates or platforms, and what
becomes of culpability and liability in such control. 28 This raises questions as to
how decisions remain within the jurisdiction of a commander’s mind? How
mental assurance requirements will be met under LOAC regimes? How
accountability will be had? What mental lines of departure exists for actions
rising to criminal culpability?
II. ROADMAP.
Using LOAC as a guide, this article seeks to provide a foundation to answer
questions and provide recommendations to facilitate a discussion as to how
commanders, or those deemed superiors, may retain cognitive and intuitive
freedom, allowing a level of responsibility and accountability for their actions.
This in turn promotes compliance with established legal regimes regarding
respondeat superior in the legal tradition of the LOAC. Indeed, results of
previous cases dealing with respondeat superior may have differed if a
technology such as BCI was available at the time. Through this article’s
discussion, recommendations such as cognitive liberty, retaining jurisdiction of
the mind, and ethical algorithm design and architecture, may assist in limiting
the impacts of BCI’s inevitable arrival on the battlefield. A potential resolution
of these issues may have consequences far beyond the niche field of LOAC,
touching upon greater questions of culpability and accountability that society
will inevitably expect to be resolved when such technologies like BCI become
increasingly ubiquitous. I will do this in parts II-VII, below. Part II describes
the LOAC regime governing commander responsibility. Part III describes brain
functions and BCI, BCI’s underlying technology, and key issues BCI poses for
the LOAC legal regime. Part IV analyzes the intersection of BCI with the LOAC
regime. Part V discusses normative implications of the intersection of BCI and
27 Id.; see Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 23(e), (Oct. 18, 1907), 36 Stat. 2227,
1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague Convention (IV)] (“[It] is especially forbidden [to] employ
arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.”); see also Legality
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 259 (July 8, 1996)
(“[T]he entire law of armed conflict . . . applies to all forms of warfare and to all kinds of
weapons, those of the past, those of the present and those of the future. . . .”).
28 ANNA ROY, NAT’L STRATEGY FOR ARTIFICIAL INTEL. 72, 88 (Arnab Kumar et al. eds.,
2018).
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the LOAC regime. Part VI provides recommended concepts to deal with the
emergence of BCI and its impact on LOAC. Part VII provides conclusory
remarks.
III. GENERAL LOAC REQUIREMENTS FOR COMMANDER’S
RESPONSIBILITY.
Within LOAC rests the concept of respondeat superior. 29 Respondeat superior
holds commanders and other superiors responsible for their own actions and
those of their subordinates when there is a failure of accountability for those
subordinates under their control. 30 This concept, tracing its roots to antiquity,
provides requisite legal requirements to determine the culpability of
commanders through a myriad of complex sets of signed documents and
normative and customary behavior. 31 One scholar notes that LOAC provides
that commanders may be held criminally liable for acts outside of their own
omission if: (1) she orders her troop to commit violations of LOAC; (2) she
disregards LOAC violations of which she is aware, or should be aware, or for
knowing them and taking no action to punish those involved; (3) she incites
violations of LOAC; (4) she fails to control troops from violating LOAC; (5) she
permits or acquiesces to violations of LOAC; and, (6) she issues manifestly
illegal orders that pass on to subordinate troops which violate LOAC. 32
Language supporting these avenues for culpability and accountability can be
found in codified international law. 33 Article 49 of the Geneva Convention I and
Article 50 of Geneva Convention II not only provide for commanders’ personal
culpability, but also provide an obligation to search and bring to justice those
who commit grave breaches of the convention. 34 The parties are also responsible
for enacting legislation to effectuate these requirements. 35 Substantively, the
SOLIS, supra note 15, at 417.
Id.
31 Jeremy Dunnaback, Command Responsibility: A Small-Unit Leader’s Perspective,
108 NW. U. L. REV. 1385, 1396 (2014) (“[T]he international community seems to have
settled on the following: [c]ommanders have a legal duty to prevent any law-of-war
violations within their chain of command.”).
32 SOLIS, supra note 15, at 417; see also TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 15, at 397 n.
954–55.
33 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. §
102–103 (AM. L. INST. 1987).
34 Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, art. 49 (Aug. 12, 1949), 75 UNTS 31; Convention (II) for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, art. 50 (Aug. 12, 1949), 75 UNTS 85; Convention for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, art. 28 (May 14, 1954), 249 U.N.T.S. 358.
35 Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 129 (Aug. 12,
1949), 75 UNTS 135; Convention (IV) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art.
29
30
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additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions provide guidance. 36 These
articles attempt to codify legal requirements found in international legal
precedent. 37 Relevant language is found in articles 86 and 87 of Additional
Protocol I to the Geneva Convention:
The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was
committed by a subordinate does not absolve his superiors from
penal disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if they knew, or
had information which should have enabled them to conclude in the
circumstances at the time, that he was committing or was going to
commit such a breach and if they did not take all feasible measures
within their power to prevent or repress the breach. 38
Moreover, commanders have a duty to prevent such acts by those they control,
and those who violate Convention prohibitions. 39 Relevant language requires
that “commensurate with their level of responsibility, commanders ensure that
members of the armed forces under their command are aware of their obligations
under the Conventions and this Protocol.” 40
And, that signatories to the Convention:
[R]equire any commander who is aware that subordinates or other
persons under his control are going to commit or have committed a
breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol . . . initiate such steps
as are necessary to prevent such violations of the Conventions or this
Protocol and, where appropriate . . . initiate disciplinary or penal
action against violators thereof. 41
The avenues of culpability and accountability for commanders demonstrated
in the language found in codified law at minimum, maintain a level of
international consensus provided by the number of signatories to the treaty. 42

146 (Aug. 12, 1949), 75 UNTS 287.
36 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), arts. 86(2) & 87 (June
8, 1977), 1125 UNTS 3.
37 See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 436–37; THE JAG LEGAL CTR. & SCH., supra note 18, at
v–vi (demonstrating that as of 2020, the Geneva Conventions have been signed by almost
every nation, which signifies not only that its standards are codified international law, but
also serves as customary international law regardless of whether a country is a signatory or
maintains reservations or objections to specific clauses); Amidst New Challenges, Geneva
Conventions Mark 70 Years of ‘Limiting Brutality’ During War, U.N. (Aug. 13, 2019),
https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/08/1044161.
38 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 86 & art. 87.
39 Id. at art. 87.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
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Codified international law is not the only body of international law that covers
culpability and accountability. Through signed agreements, promulgation of
policy, and case law, customary international law also provides authority for a
commander’s criminal liability for their actions and actions of their
subordinates. 43 “Customary international law is law made over time by
widespread and consistent state practice, acting from a sense of legal
obligation.” 44 Consistent state practice can include diplomatic acts or
instructions, public measures, or official policy statements of a state. Acting
from a sense of legal obligation can include state actions done not merely for
habit or courtesy, this can also be shown through official policy statements or
official legal opinions by a state on a matter of international law. 45 These
practices morph into rules of international law and include agreements in which
more than one country signs. 46 For example, the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, signed by over 130 countries, provides a
framework and process to hold “persons accountable for the most serious crimes
of international concern.” 47 By its own provisions, it is supplemental to national
criminal jurisdictions, and when coupled with the number of country signatories,
adds to the body of customary law. 48 Articles 25 and 28 of the statute
respectfully provide that “a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for
punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person . . .
[o]rders . . . the commission of such crime which in fact occurs or is
attempted[.]” 49
A military commander or person effectively acting as a military
43 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW THE U.S. §§ 102(1)(a)–(c),
(2), 103(1); United States v. Mohammad, 398 F. Supp. 3d 1233, 1242 (USCMCR 2019)
(“Sources of international law include . . . ‘international agreements, and general principles
of law.’”) (internal citations omitted).
44 Mohammad, 398 F. Supp. 3d at 1242.
45 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW THE U.S. § 102 cmts. a, b.
46 Mohammad, 398 F. Supp. 3d at 1241–42 (citing Doe v. Exxon Mobile Corp., 654
F.3d 11, 42 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated on other grounds, 527 Fed. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013)).
47 U.N.: Rome Statute of The International Criminal Court, art. 1 (July 17, 1998), 37
I.L.M. 999; Symposium, Redefining International Criminal Law: New Interpretations and
New Solutions: Criminal Law: The Constitutionality of The Rome Statute of The
International Criminal Court, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 983, 991 (“The Rome Statute
reflects the convergence of the common law and civil law systems, varying nation by nation,
that constitute the global administration of criminal law.”).
48 U.N.: Rome Statute of The International Criminal Court, supra note 47, art. 1, art. 10;
Symposium, Redefining International Criminal Law, supra note 47, at 1032 (“Other laws of
nations include those atrocity crimes confirmed in customary international law that form the
subject matter jurisdiction of the Rome Statute, namely, genocide, crimes against humanity,
war crimes, and aggression, although the latter crime is neither defined nor enforceable yet
for ICC purposes.”).
49 U.N.: Rome Statute of The International Criminal Court, supra note 47, art. 25 & art.
28.
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commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under his or her
effective command and control, or effective authority and control as
the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control
properly over such forces, where: That military commander or
person either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should
have known that the forces were committing or about to commit such
crimes; and that military commander or person failed to take all
necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to
prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution. 50
Clarifying the relationship of subordinate and superior culpability and
accountability, the statutes provides that a “superior” shall be held liable for
crimes or attempted crimes committed by those under his or her “effective
control” where the superior “knew” or “consciously disregards information
which clearly” indicates that their subordinates are committing or are about to
commit a crime. 51 However, the superior must have “failed to take all necessary
and reasonable measures” within their power to prevent or repress the
commission of crimes. 52 Lastly, if all else fails, the superior must submit the
matter to competent authorities for investigation and prosecution. 53 From its
language, avenues 1 through 6 for culpability and accountability, above, are
covered in this article.
Other, more specific, statutes convening war crimes tribunals mimic the
Rome Statute, specifically the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) and the updated Statue of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia. 54 Both, identical in substance, provide:
[Violations] committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her
superior of criminal responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to
know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done
so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable
measures to prevent such acts or to punish them thereof. 55
These statutes also demonstrate international consensus in holding
commanders responsible for actions of their troop. Albeit, here, this consensus
takes place in the fashion of customary law with roots in international case

Id. at art. 28(1).
Id.
52 Id. at art. 28(2).
53 Id.
54 S.C. Res. 955, art. 6 ¶ 3 (Nov. 8, 1994).
55 Id.; U.N. Secretary General, Report Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808, Annex (1993), art. 6 ¶ 3 UN Doc. S/25704 (1993).
50
51
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precedent. 56
A review of both codified and customary international law leads to core terms
and elements that provide the legal regime for respondeat superior. 57 First, there
must be a superior-subordinate relationship between a commander and their
troops. 58 Commander, as it is used in these statutes, denotes civilian and military
officials who by nature of their position effectively control forces, regardless of
size. 59 This usually stems from command responsibility, the authority to issue
orders, and the ability to impose disciplinary action if not followed. 60 Second, a
commander (or superior) must have knowledge or information that gives them
a level of awareness of violations occurring. 61 This could mean actual or
constructive knowledge, both forms of knowledge prevent a superior from
remaining willfully ignorant or nonchalant about LOAC violations. 62 However,
neither constructive knowledge nor negligence will be considered a form of
strict liability. 63 Third, a commander (or superior) must fail to take any action to
prevent violations from occurring or do nothing after the fact to punish those
responsible for the violations. 64 This could cover actions such as conducting an
investigation, convening a court-martial, or submitting subordinates to
international authorities. 65 These elements are interpreted in varying degrees
depending on venue or the specific legal regime involved, but they are adequate
to cover the basics of the conversation and cover the six avenues for culpability
and accountability. 66 The most important point, however, is that this legal
regime always hinges on the actions of a commander, or their lack thereof.
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 15, at 397–99 n. 955, 960–61.
See Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1, 26, 37 (1946) (J. Murphy, dissenting). There are
many more terms here found in statutes, such as who constitutes “armed forces;” who is a
“competent authority” to “submit” matters of LOAC violations; what is a “reasonable” or
“feasible” measure to punish those who violate LOAC; what is an adequate “investigation”
or “prosecution;” etc.? Many of these terms would no doubt be pulled from other
international law sources or case law. For example, “armed forces” could mean those
considered combatants under articles 2 and 3 of the Geneva Convention. An adequate
investigation or prosecution, for example, would be judged according to the standards of the
violator’s national laws. There is no doubt that these questions may be resolved by the
victor(s) in an armed conflict, but preferably under the standards of justice vice, as Justice
Murphy notes in a famous case, “revenge and vindictiveness” freely masquerading as “false
legalism.”
58 See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 437.
59 See id. at 437; see also Greg R. Vetter, Command Responsibility of Non-Military
Superiors in the International Criminal Court, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 89, 103–05 (2000).
60 See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 437.
61 Id. at 438.
62 Id. at 437–38.
63 See id. at 436.
64 See id. at 428, 436, 438.
65 See id. at 428–29.
66 See, e.g., Evan Wallach & Maxine Marcus, Command Responsibility, INT’L L. WAR
J., http://lawofwar.org/command_responsibility.htm (last visited May 17, 2021).
56
57
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Culpability and accountability for commanders and other superiors for their
actions and those of their subordinates is presumed to be traced human-tohuman. 67 Disruptions occur, however, when the scienter of criminal culpability
and accountability no longer rest with a human actor, but instead, is driven by
factors and actions of a controlled platform or device, which through its system
design and function, resembles human-to-human command and control. 68 The
drafters of these avenues to culpability and accountability for commanders may
not have foreseen future warfare where human intuitive decisions are replaced
by algorithmic decisions or manipulation, possibly breaking the casual link of
scienter to positive action or to actions of subordinates. 69 However, this
disruption may not totally excuse commanders from their responsibilities under
LOAC by using these platforms, and the destructive results remain subject to
standards provided by international law. 70
IV. BCI & DISRUPTION.
To understand how BCI affects the neurological process of decision-making
by a commander or other superior, and its relation to intent, knowledge, and
voluntary acts, it is integral to understand how the brain works in this capacity.
The brain controls the ability to think and uses thinking to generate action by the
human body. 71 This is done through a system of nerves that connect to other
parts of the body directly or through the spinal cord. 72 This system of nerves
produces electronic signals when stimulated by nerve cells through the sharing
of information, which allows thought and action—which lies at the heart of BCI
technology. 73
The major parts of the brain effectuating decision-making and action are the
Cerebrum, Cerebellum, and the brain stem. 74 The Cerebrum controls reading,
thinking, learning, speech, emotions, and planned muscle movements. 75 It also

See Vetter, supra note 59, at 92, 115.
See Buchan & Tsagourias, supra note 16, at 670–71.
69 See id. at 646–47.
70 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 27 (“[T]he entire law
of armed conflict . . . applies to all forms of warfare and to all kinds of weapons, those of the
past, those of the present and those of the future. . . .”).
71 How the Brain Works, JOHNS HOPKINS MED., https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/
neurology_neurosurgery/ centers_clinics/brain_tumor/about-brain-tumors/how-the-brainworks.html (last visited May 17, 2021).
72 Id.
73 See Gonfalonieri, supra note 26.
74 How the Brain Works, supra note 71.
75 Id.
67
68
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controls vision, hearing and other senses. 76 It is divided into two cerebral halves:
left and right, which cover their respective, self-explanatory portions. 77 Each
halve has four lobes: frontal—which plays a major part in complex cognitive,
emotional, and behavioral functioning through the prefrontal cortex, 78 parietal,
temporal and occipital. 79 They collectively control personality, decisionmaking, reasoning, speech, sense, memory, and smell. 80 The Cerebellum, which
resides in the back of the brain, controls balance, coordination, and fine muscle
control such as walking. It also functions as a means to control posture and
balance. 81 Finally, the Brain Stem—which resides at the bottom of the brain and
connects the Cerebrum to the spinal cord—controls bodily functions such as
breathing, eye movements, heartbeat, and blood pressure. 82 All of these major
parts play a role for purposes of this article’s discussion as they are impacted by
BCI. 83
BCI generally encompasses systems that allow a user to externally control or
communicate with technology using only the electrical signals and impulses that
are produced by the aforementioned sections of the brain. 84 The main process in
which this occurs, today, is by way of Electroencephalography (EEG). 85 EEG
is the physiological process by which a method of choice records electrical
activity generated by the brain via electrodes placed on or in the head,
particularly, the parts of the brain discussed above. 86 These EEG signals come
from the brain, which are then extracted or captured by signal acquisition,
subsequently decoded using an algorithm, and either given a control signal for
use of exterior platforms or cursor controls. 87 Advanced methods include the use
of artificial intelligence, machine learning, neural networks, and deep machine
See id.
See id.
78 Christopher Bergland, The Neuroscience of Making a Decision, PSYCHOL. TODAY
(May 6, 2015), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-athletes-way/201505/theneuroscience-making-decision.
79 See How the Brain Works, supra note 71.
80 See id.
81 See id.
82 See id.
83 See Johnathan Wolpaw et al., Brain-Computer Interface Technology: A Review of the
First International Meeting, 8 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON REHAB. ENG’G 164 (June 2000); see
also Jo Best, What is a Brain-Computer Interface? Everything You Need to Know About
BCIs, Neural Interfaces and the Future of Mind-Reading Computers, ZDNET (Nov. 13,
2019), https://www.zdnet.com/article/what-IS-bci-everything-you-need-to-know-aboutbrain-computer-interfaces-and-the-future-of-mind-reading-computers/.
84 Wolpaw et al., supra note 83, at 164; see also Best, supra note 83.
85 Best, supra note 83.
86 See Wolpaw et al., supra note 83, at 165; see also Schuller, supra note 10, at 379,
386, 388; see also Buchan & Tsagourias, supra note 16, at 648–50 (discussing the concept
known as “humans in the loop”).
87 Wolpaw et al., supra note 83, at 166.
76
77

14

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

[Vol. 29.2

learning processes for pattern recognition, which assists in the rehabilitation or
training of a controlling human or artificial platform. 88 Depending on an
organization’s goal for the use of BCI, either route of using EEG appears
adequate for disruption due to the process of capturing, acquiring, encoding,
decoding, and producing a control signal. The crux being that original scienter
connected to positive action, or even knowledge itself, could be affected in the
process, rendering actions by a user involuntary or unreasonable. 89
It is important to understand that BCI involvement with applications to
military operations are not new. 90 From its advent in the 1970s, research has
been conducted to figure out how to create more intimate interaction between
humans and computers using “biofeedbacks” or “biocybernetics” to assist in the
control of vehicles, weaponry, or other systems. 91 What was theoretical in the
1970s, due to lack of technological maturity, is today quite real due to
advancements in robotics, artificial intelligence, machine learning, and the use
of large data samples. 92 These advancements not only allow for the efficient
external control of platforms due to signals from the brain, but they also allow
feedback and modification for better performance (brain stimulation, memory
capacity, and durability). 93 This in-turn promotes better lethality, speed,
adaptability, and efficiency of weapons systems—a prime concern and goal in
strategy for technologically advanced nations and their militaries. 94
As applied to LOAC, which provides a framework for mitigating the
destructive nature of technological advancements of weapons used in war, the
technological disruption occurs at the point of decision-making and
accountability for subordinate actions. 95 According to rules governing
respondeat superior, intuition is not enough to be held responsible for
subordinates’ actions, nor is intuition, alone, good enough to impart culpability
or accountability on any individual. 96 There must be a level of intent or
knowledge, based on circumstances, followed by a manifested and voluntary act,

88 See Josh Merel et al., Encoder-Decoder Optimization for Brain-Computer Interfaces,
11 PLOS COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY 4 (2015).
89 See Stephen Rainey et al., When Thinking is Doing: Responsibility for BCI-Mediated
Action, 11 AJOB NEUROSCIENCE 49 (Feb. 3, 2020); Andreas Kuersten, Legal Ramifications of
Brain-Computer-Interface Technology, 11 AJOB NEUROSCIENCE 61–63 (Feb. 3, 2020) (citing
Open Peer Commentaries).
90 Wolpaw et al., supra note 83, at 165.
91 Id.
92 Id. (discussing the technological changes in the field since the 1970s which had led to
the advancements seen today).
93 Cybernetics, supra note 1.
94 Ali, supra note 19, at 4–5.
95 See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 417.
96 See id.
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or failure to act, which produces foreseeable results and a failure of
accountability. 97
The process described above may limit the respondeat superior regime due to
the underlying technology. For instance, an algorithm is a set of step-by-step
instructions to a computer in a language it can understand as code. 98 These
algorithms are looped in this way to prevent the need to manually type code for
every instance. 99 Many algorithms for complex systems and platforms run
millions of lines of code. 100 Accordingly, code requires intelligent, automated
decision-making to produce algorithms to solve problems. 101
The implementation of artificial intelligence solves this issue as a process that
mimics human thinking by making rational decisions in a given environment
based upon information inputted, observed, and experienced. 102 Moreover,
machine learning, and other forms of deep-machine learning, assists artificial
intelligence in developing algorithms to solve problems and training on massive
pre-programmed data sets that are matched via algorithm through a variety of
methods such as adversarial competition, micromanagement, neural network
filtering, and other corrective measures. 103 The data fed to this process of
machine learning and artificial intelligence decision-making can occur
simultaneously. 104 This raises the possibility that algorithms produced to
encourage or stimulate better performance of a human actor may be driven and
dictated by the machine. The end result is that decisions may no longer be
human, instead, the machine is in a supervisory capacity with the ability to
impose its will through a form of cerebral manipulation. 105 Through the process
of machine learning, better and more efficient algorithms are produced to assist
artificial intelligence, even to the point of surpassing human competition and

See id. at 436.
MICHAEL KEARNS & AARON ROTH, THE ETHICAL ALGORITHM: THE SCI. OF SOCIALLY
AWARE ALGORITHM DESIGN 4 (Oxford Univ. Press ed. 2020) (“[A]n algorithm is nothing
more than a very precisely specified series of instructions for performing some concrete
task.”); DARRELL M. WEST & JOHN R. ALLEN, TURNING POINT: POLICY MAKING IN THE ERA
OF A.I. 221 (Brookings Inst. Press ed. 2020) (“[A]lgorithms are a sequence of instructions
telling a computer what to do.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
99 KEARNS & ROTH, supra note 98, at 9–10.
100 See id. at 9; see also Cade Metz, Google is 2 Billion Lines of Code–and It’s All in
One Place, WIRED (Sept. 16, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/09/google-2-billion-linescodeand-one-place/.
101 See Metz, supra note 100.
102 See Capt. Salahudin Ali, Cybersecurity Support of Insider Threat Operations, 30
GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 1, 14–17 (2019).
103 See id. at 15–17.
104 See id.
105 See id. (discussing the process of how artificial intelligence uses the imputed data and
its own algorithms to continually improve without the need for human intervention).
97
98
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superiority. 106
BCI also presents issues of cybersecurity and transparency that may affect the
ability to impart culpability and accountability on commanders accountable for
their actions and those of their subordinates. Cybersecurity is “considered a
service that uses a process of protecting information and information systems by
preventing, detecting, and responding to unauthorized access” and uses of the
network’s resources. 107 Transparency is generally considered the ability to
understand why an AI makes decisions or selects certain data to make
decisions. 108 AI and ML have been plagued by the inability to understand why
they choose certain data, as well as the ability to understand and trace decisionmaking. 109 The ability to discern action, explain why it occurs, or to forensically
diagnose action are all present. 110 Moreover, the ability to exploit vulnerabilities,
known and unknown, presents additional complications. 111 Not only will it be
difficult to diagnose issues of malfunction, but also the ability to protect a user
from exploitation by outside actors whether through data manipulation or
outright hacking. 112 Both issues will present difficulties in determining
culpability. 113
If a situation arises where an algorithm replaces and dictates manifest action,
or lack thereof, due to its decision that such action is most rational, the legal
regime holding commanders accountable for even external platformsubordinates may be called into question. 114 It may be difficult to demonstrate
where a commander “knew” or “should have known,” where any act was indeed

106 WEST & ALLEN, supra note 98, at 221, 226 (describing the concept of singularity,
“[M]achine-based superintelligence [that is] greater than human intelligence.”) (internal
citation and brackets omitted); see Ali, supra note 102, at 15 n. 98 (describing the concept of
general intelligence, whereas artificial intelligence develops the ability to pull all available
sources of knowledge and experience across multiple domains to develop intuitive thought
mimicking humans).
107 Ali, supra note 102, at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting CHRIS JAIKARAN,
CONG. RES. SERV., R45127, CYBERSECURITY: SELECTED ISSUES FOR THE 115TH CONGRESS
(2018)).
108 Ron Schmelzer, Towards A More Transparent AI, FORBES (May 23, 2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/cognitiveworld/2020/05/23/towards-a-more-transparentai/?sh=3035e0773d93.
109 Id.; see also WEST & ALLEN, supra note 98, at 211 (noting that the same AI can be
used “for both beneficial and malicious purposes.”).
110 Schmelzer, supra note 108.
111 KEARNS & ROTH, supra note 98, at 7; WEST & ALLEN, supra note 98, at 173.
112 KEARNS & ROTH, supra note 98, at 7–8; WEST & ALLEN, supra note 98, at 211.
113 ANDREW FEICKERT ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45392, U.S. GROUND FORCES
ROBOTICS AND AUTONOMOUS SYS. (RAS) AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: CONSIDERATIONS
FOR CONG. 30 (2018).
114 See ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 816–22 (describing the theories behind various
criminal law structures).
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voluntary, or where a known foreseeable act occurred when algorithmic
decision-making processes dictates otherwise. 115 Without the ability to discern
requisite knowledge or intent, and voluntary action, the LOAC regime of
respondeat superior will be seriously challenged.
V. INTERSECTION AND APPLICATION.
The above discussion of BCI and LOAC requirements may impact the
avenues of culpability and accountability for commanders. 116 A discussion of
BCI’s impact is appropriately applied to these six avenues given they are
covered by the LOAC regimes discussed thus far.
A. Avenue (1) & (6): a commander is liable for orders she issues that violate
LOAC. A commander is liable for manifestly illegal orders she issues to
subordinates.
In a general scenario, it is abundantly clear that an unambiguous order from a
commander to violate LOAC would render her liable if the order is executed by
her subordinates. 117 This conclusion is grounded in international law. 118 She
would have satisfied the elements provided above in being a commander, having
effective control of troops and, potentially, failing to prevent or mitigate
violations. 119 The order will be grounded in a finding based explicitly or by
reasonable inference that she made the illegal order. 120 For instance, her battle
plans and actions that demonstrate they were executed may be used as evidence
of her positive act, serving as the precipice for subordinate action. 121 This must
115 S.C. Res. 995 ¶ 6 (detailing the circumstances where commanders will be held liable
for another’s actions).
116 See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 426–31.
117 See id. at 428; see also supra Part II.
118 See Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milosevic, No. IT-98-29/1-A, 98–106 (Nov. 12, 2009).
The accused was charged with a variety of crimes committed based upon his orders. The
trial court found him liable for directly ordering his subordinates to commit violations of
international law. The Appeals court, however, quashed charges of direct orders after
finding a lack of proof regarding “positive” action that demonstrates he ordered
subordinates to commit violations. Essentially, there were other reasonable and plausible
explanations. One piece of evidence offered was that the accused ordered his troops to
comply with international humanitarian law in conducting operations.
119 See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 428; see TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 15, at 397; see
also Vetter, supra note 59, at 119–20.
120 Dragomir Milosevic, No. IT-98-29/1-A at 99–100 (“In principle, this approach [of
finding guilt for violations based on inference from circumstantial evidence] is not
erroneous as such, given that both actus reus and the mens rea of ordering can be
established through inference from circumstantial evidence, provided that those inferences
are the only reasonable ones.”).
121 See, e.g., id. at 99–100; see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milosevic, No. IT-98-29/1-
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be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, however, with no other reasonable
interpretation of the commander’s requisite intent followed by subordinate
action being plausible. 122
BCI would impact this legal regime through multiple arguments that, on the
extreme end, her intentions and plans were stimulated during a planning phase
to provide plans that violated LOAC. Recall that BCI can be used to train a user
for better performance or stimulate brain activity to provide more rational
courses-of-action chosen by artificial intelligence. 123 In such an instance, it may
be reasonable to conclude, given BCI’s nascent nature, that there are other
plausible and reasonable reasons why violations occurred. This may prevent a
finding beyond a reasonable doubt that a commander ordered her troop to
commit violations of LOAC because it presents levels of ambiguity in the
development of her mental state, as well as the connection to acts of her
subordinates. 124 Essentially, her acts and intent, even intuitively, are not her
own. This would also be true if a BCI platform manipulates brain signals through
the conversion phase to pass orders which violate LOAC to her subordinates,
thus breaking the causal connection between intent and subsequent action. 125
If the commander is not responsible in this instance, then who is? Recall that
civilians and other superiors (or overseers) are also included in the legal regime
as commanders. 126 One could argue that the commander is superior, or the
scientist overseeing a BCI platform during this instance is responsible for the
LOAC violations. 127 This may be unreasonable as one would also have to prove
they possessed the requisite intent and positive action to order a LOAC
violation. 128 Other, more reasonable explanations, such as negligence or flawed
design in the BCI’s data architecture, would prevent culpability for plans in
which they did not design coming into fruition by acts of the commander’s
subordinates. 129
All parties’ culpability and accountability in this example would, potentially,

T, 318–19 (Dec. 12, 2007).
122 Dragomir Milosevic, No. IT-98-29/1-A at 100.
123 Gonfalonieri, supra note 26.
124 Dragomir Milosevic, No. IT-98-29/1-A at 100–01.
125 Id. at 395; see Bathaee, supra note 12, at 891, 927; see also Rainey et al., supra note
89, at 51; Kuersten, supra note 89, at 61, 63.
126 See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 417–18; see also TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 15, at
397–99; see also Vetter, supra note 59, at 103–05.
127 See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 338–39, nn. 60–61 (stating that civilians are liable for
LOAC violations depending on their level of involvement, even when they are not
considered a party to a conflict).
128 See ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 815, 818, 823; see also Bathaee, supra note 12, at
890, 891.
129 See Ali, supra note 102, at 14–17, 22.
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depend upon what actions they took after the violations occurred. 130 It is not
enough for a violation to be present, but there must be a failure to prevent
violations or a failure of accountability after-the-fact. 131 If no action was taken,
assuming one could prove all other elements, then perhaps culpability may be
more plausible. 132 If so, findings may still be difficult to achieve. 133
B. Avenue (2) & (5): a commander is liable when she disregards LOAC
violations of which she is aware, or should be aware, or for knowing them and
taking no action to punish those involved. A commander is liable for actions of
subordinates for which she acquiesces.
There are instances where international law holds commanders accountable
for failing to act on information that would allow them to responsibly prevent
LOAC violations or punish those who commit them. 134 The key to this legal
regime is based upon a “dereliction of duty.” 135 In this instance, the information
must be such that it provided sufficient notice, either constructively or explicitly,
that LOAC violations would occur or are occurring. 136 If a commander is
deemed to have sufficient notice, or constructively deemed to have sufficient
notice, she must take action to hold subordinates accountable that are not
insufficient or incongruent compared to the LOAC violations she seeks to
address. 137
What is deemed insufficient or incongruent compared with the LOAC
violation at hand is based upon the degree of authority and control the
commander has of her subordinates. 138 Indeed, international law requires
commanders to have sufficient control and authority of troops and not to remain
willfully ignorant of information to prevent a LOAC violation. 139 Recall that
respondeat superior is not a negligence regime. 140 Previous international law
cases have shown or called into question a commander’s culpability where
ambiguity exists regarding the information a commander had when LOAC
violations occurred, and where a commander did not hold subordinates

Vetter, supra note 59, at 89, 119–20.
See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 432; see also Vetter, supra note 59, at 89, 100.
132 Vetter, supra note 59, at 89, 92–93, 99; see also SOLIS, supra note 15, at 418
(outlining the commanders implicit liability based on inaction and prevention).
133 See Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milosevic, No. IT-98-29/1-T, 55, 104 (Dec. 12, 2007).
134 SOLIS, supra note 15, at 428.
135 See id. at 432.
136 See id. at 429.
137 See id.
138 See id.
139 U.N.: Rome Statute of The International Criminal Court, supra note 47, art. 28(b).
140 See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 432.
130
131
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accountable. 141 In the absence of direct evidence or strong explicit evidence that
sufficient information existed, culpability may be hard to prove. 142
To assist in analyzing whether adequate information was available to a
commander and their failure to address potential and actual LOAC violations,
international law has developed a test for inquiry. This test includes: (1) the
number of illegal acts; (2) the type of illegal acts; (3) the scope of illegal acts;
(4) the time during which the illegal acts occurred; (5) the number of troops
involved; (6) the logistics involved, if any; (7) the geographic location of the
acts; (8) the widespread occurrences of the acts; (9) the widespread occurrences
of the acts; (10) the tactical tempo of operations; (11) the modus operandi of
similar illegal acts; (12) officers and staff involved; and, (13) the location of the
commander at the time. 143 The existence of these elements may render the
commander culpable for her failure to act on adequate information before or
after violations occur. 144 If knowledge is proven, the commander may escape
culpability by proving such things as published orders, directives, or rules of
engagement that put subordinates on notice of their responsibility to adhere to
the LOAC regime. 145 A commander may escape liability if he could not
reasonably have known about the criminal intent of a subordinate. 146 If not,
actions such as forwarding information for investigation to superiors or
prosecution via courts martial may suffice; determining whether these actions
are adequate or not is an extremely fact-intensive exercise, and requires a degree
of value judgment to ensure accountability of subordinates by the commander is
not pretextual or a legal fiction. 147 There is no doubt this may be an ex-post facto
judgment, subject to the scrutiny of the commander’s superiors or worst—her

141 Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 35–36 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (questioning the commander’s
liability for failing to effectively control troops when his resources and measures used to
control troops have been taken away from him).
142 Id. at 38, 40 (highlighting that an inability to control troops alone does not render one
guilty of a war crime in the absence of culpability); see also SOLIS, supra note 15, at 439
(“In Delalic, the ICTY concluded that the ‘knew or had reason to know’ standard set in
Article 7(3) of the [ICTY] Statute must be interpreted as requiring the commander: (i) to
have ‘actual knowledge, established through direct or circumstantial evidence, that his
subordinates were committing or about to commit crimes. . .’”).
143 Prosecutor v. Delalic, et al. IT-96-21-T, 386 (Nov. 16, 1998).
144 Id. at 122.
145 See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 432–33.
146 See id. at 432 (demonstrating that after the May Lai massacre in the Vietnam War,
each defendant had been referred to court-martial for their violations after their violations
were discovered by General Westmoreland. Moreover, before the incidents occurred,
General Westmoreland had published orders regularly forbidding acts constituting war
crimes).
147 S.C. Res. 955, art. 6 ¶ 3, art. 7.
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adversaries. 148
BCI presents another challenge to this already nuanced analysis. This is
primarily due to the requirement to prove a level of knowledge existed on behalf
of the commander. 149 What may appear to be clear information of a LOAC
violation may be impacted by the underlying process of BCI through signal
acquisition, conversion, output, and rational decision-making of algorithms
produced by machine learning. 150 Clearly, if a BCI platform edits orders, rules
of engagement, or “weaponeering” limitations that are passed to subordinates
without a commander’s knowledge, initial preventative requirements of the
commander would not be present. 151 Culpability may switch to those who were
charged with ensuring the platform would not take such actions, possibly
through its digital design. 152 It may also be the case that the commander’s
superiors or overseers had a responsibility to stop such actions in real-time as
they were occurring. 153 On an extreme end, if the commander—or anyone else
for that matter—were presented with false information by the BCI that LOAC
violations were not occurring, none would be culpable. 154
Post-LOAC violation, certain actions could provide an avenue to escape
culpability when evidence has become available. 155 An analysis of mitigation
efforts such as reconfiguration, restructuring of machine learning and algorithm
safeguards, as well as better testing and micromanagement of systems could
provide sufficient action to ensure violations are not reoccurring. 156 On the
personnel end, criminal prosecution, investigations, and a host of other
accountability measures may prove adequate depending on the type of
violation. 157 If not, the analysis shifts back to whom had sufficient control of
subordinates and their perceived failure to address violations of their
subordinates. 158
C. Avenue (3): A Commander is responsible for LOAC violations in which she

See ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 823.
See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 428.
150 See supra Part IV.
151 See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 437 (outlining the knowledge requirement for superior
liability for actions taken by subordinates); see Wallach & Marcus, supra note 66.
152 See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 441.
153 See id. at 440–41.
154 See id. at 428–29.
155 See id. at 451 (outlining a case where a commander was found not culpable for the
actions of his subordinates where evidence demonstrated that the commander lacked any
sort of knowledge of his subordinates’ crimes).
156 See id.
157 See id. at 452.
158 See id.
148
149
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incites.
Although not a direct order, a commander may be culpable for actions she
takes that amount to LOAC violations through implicit motivation. 159 This is
action in the form of criminal recklessness, reasonably foreseeing and
encouraging violations that occur in which the commander does not take
measures to prevent. 160 This requires knowledge that violations will occur by
placing others in a position and instigating a commission of a LOAC
violation. 161 This is not to be mistaken with negligence; here, the commander’s
motivation and instigation serve as crucial factors. 162
BCI’s technical process would make proving this avenue of culpability and
accountability extremely difficult. 163 Given that it is based upon brain signals—
which could be stimulated to drive action—motivation may not be imparted on
a commander. 164 Intuition, which is one aspect of BCI, is not enough for
liability. 165 Connecting a positive act to such intuition would have to overcome
the argument that a BCI did not serve as the motivating factor, and that
subordinate actions were caused by the commander’s instigation. 166 Possibly a
purposeful failure to follow established user protocols for a BCI or, for overseers
and other superiors, designing a platform to drive violations of subordinates may
be enough to establish culpability. 167 The level of digital forensics to prove this,
however, would be difficult. 168 This avenue of culpability and accountability
may be the most difficult avenue to establish liability.
D. Avenue (4): A Commander is liable for violations committed by
subordinates she fails to control.
Commanders have a duty to discharge their authority to control subordinates
when they have effective control. 169 This is another requirement for
commanders to avoid derelictions of duty where they are in a position to prevent
159 See id. at 429–30 (quoting Trial of Erich Heyer and Six Others, “111e Essen
Lynching Case,” British Military Court (Dec. 1945), I LRTWC 88, 89-90).
160 U.N. War Crim. Comm’n, L. Reps. on Trials of War Criminals 88, 89–90 (1947).
161 Id. at 89–90.
162 Id. at 90, 92.
163 See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 436; see also Wallach & Marcus, supra note 66.
164 See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 436; see also Wallach & Marcus, supra note 66.
165 See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 427–33; see also Wallach & Marcus, supra note 66.
166 See Rainey et al., supra note 89, at 49–50, 55; Kuersten, supra note 89.
167 NICK BOSTROM, SUPERINTELLIGENCE.: PATHS, DANGER, AND STRATEGIES 158 (Oxford
Univ. Press ed. 2014).
168 See supra Part III.
169 See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 430; see also Vetter, supra note 59, at 89, 102, 105;
Wallach & Marcus, supra note 66.
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LOAC violations or hold those accountable who commit them. 170 Previous cases
demonstrate that this responsibility may be imparted on commanders where
sufficient information exists that large-scale violations are occurring, where it
would be unreasonable to assume that a commander was not aware of such
violations, and failed to exercise their authority to prevent violations or hold
those accountable who commit them. 171
BCI provides complications to this regime. Given the underlying
technologies’ abilities to manipulate inputs and outputs of information via brain
signals, a commander may not be able to cross the threshold of being aware of
violations. 172 An argument could still be made that, given the technology and its
ability to manipulate information, commanders should have taken measures to
ensure their information is accurate in the input and output stage. 173 This may
amount to negligence or a low level of recklessness, which is not covered by
international legal regimes governing respondeat superior. 174 Once information
does become available ex post facto, a commander will be judged vis-à-vis their
actions to hold her subordinates accountable. 175
In this avenue, an overseer or other superior supervising the commander may
be better positioned for accountability. 176 Their actions also must be more than
negligence. 177 Failures in programming, training, failsafe mechanisms, or user
instructions would not be enough. 178 But, if these parties were aware of what the
technology was doing or were aware of its capability to override a commander’s
brain signals during its employment, it would make them sufficiently aware that
widespread violations were occurring. 179 If allowed, they could be deemed to
have failed to control such technology and subordinates or, at minimum,
acquiesced to the violations which had occurred. 180
VI. NORMATIVE ARGUMENTS.
Important aspects of technology and its ability to disrupt industry are the ways
it impacts normative behaviors developed by society that govern certain
See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 430.
See id. at 446.
172 See supra Part III.
173 See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 338–39 n. 60–61, 432, 732–51; see also Vetter, supra
note 59, at 124.
174 Buchan & Tsagourias, supra note 16, at 661.
175 Id. at 649.
176 See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 429.
177 See id. at 436–37; see also Vetter, supra note 59, at 102–05.
178 See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 437; see also Vetter, supra note 59, at 115–16; see also
BOSTROM, supra note 167, at 155–76.
179 See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 430.
180 See id.
170
171
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activities. Legal regimes do not address all behaviors, oftentimes they address
positive questions regarding human activity. 181 Norms govern societal
expectations as to how legal regimes are exercised and how legal authority is
managed. 182 Answers to these questions are important because we must decide
what type of society we want to live in, considering the emergence of invasive
technologies that infringe upon one of the most inherent aspects of what it means
to be human: the ability to think freely and make voluntary decisions. 183 If
algorithms and machines drive thought and decision making, a legitimate
question arises as to whether the definition of “human” in future conflict remains
accurate where such algorithms and machines drive a decision to take human
life. 184 Legal regimes may not be able to accurately govern such activity if a
common understanding of norms is not settled.
At a fundamental level, war is a human endeavor. 185 It is an extension of
mankind’s political aptitude and nature as a means of exercising real-politik—
bundled into nation-states, it is merely a clash of wills to achieve objectives. 186
These objectives are comprised of the collective that makes a nation-state, driven
by common attitudes rooted in an understanding for survival, and the need to
acquire resources. 187 This understanding is inherent in humans as a part of the
evolutionary process, one in which machine and its algorithms, have taken no
part. 188 Algorithms and machines are not yet capable of comprehending the
shared human experience. 189 Although programmed by humans, the advent of
methodologies such as machine learning may allow for an evolutionary leap in
technology’s ability to resemble something akin to reproducing a shared
experience. 190 However, this shared experience would be limited to that of the

181 See Clifton B. Parker, Law May Be Ineffective If They Don’t Reflect Social Norms,
Stanford Scholar Says, STANFORD REP. (Nov. 24, 2014), https://news.stanford.edu.
182 See id.
183 See Calvin Kraft & James Giordano, Integrating Brain Science and Law:
Neuroscientific Evidence and Legal Perspectives on Protecting Individual Liberties, 11
FRONTIERS IN NEUROSCI. 1 (2017).
184 See Schuller, supra note 10, at 389 (“We must determine whether AWS technology
could unlawfully dilute this causal link such that we could no longer say that a human
functionally decided to kill.”).
185 U.S. MARINE CORPS, WARFIGHTING 1–5 (Dep’t of the Navy, 2018) (“[W]ar is a
human enterprise. . . .”).
186 Id. at 2–3 (“War is an extension of both policy and politics with the addition of
military force.”).
187 See Bart Klem, Dealing with Scarcity and Violent Conflict 1, 37 (Neth. Inst. of Int’l
Rel. Clingendael Working Paper No. 24, 2003).
188 See Max Tegmark, The Third Stage Of Life? A.I., SCI. FRIDAY (Aug. 25, 2017),
https://www.sciencefriday.com/articles/tegmark/.
189 See id.
190 See id.
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digital world. 191
An understanding as to what drives armed conflict and basic instinct of
survival and mitigation efforts afforded to fellow humans will remain in the
human domain. Due to our shared experience, conflict seeks a resolution as
quickly as possible through another inherent quality found in the humans:
empathy. 192 Empathy for ceasing the widespread destruction of armed conflict
serves as a motivator to reach an accord in ending conflict. 193 This is shown by
the myriad of treaties and diplomatic apparatus that seeks to either prevent
conflict or bring it to a close once objectives are realized to the satisfaction of
each party involved. 194 Empathy in this context is contrary to the brute logic and
rationale used to achieve objectives that are programmed into algorithms. 195
Ending a conflict based on empathy, where there remains the possibility of
victory, may be illogical in an algorithmic regime. 196
Some may argue that this is hyperbolic and that emerging technologies such
as BCI merely augment human intelligence and thought, which makes humans
more efficient and a cerebrally greater species. 197 But this criticism would fail
to capture situations where emerging technology has surpassed its humancreator. Empathy and mitigation in armed conflict are basic concepts. 198 It would
be disappointing if the efficiency and ability to augment intelligence LOAC
seeks to achieve does not result in a better mitigation of the destructive results
that inevitably arise from armed conflict. 199
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS.
The question remains as to what solutions or concepts can be developed to
prevent BCI from negatively impacting culpability and accountability regimes
in armed conflict. Below are three recommendations that are in development by
industry and academia that call attention to problems associated with BCI and
provide solutions.

191 Zita Fontaine, Will Machines Ever Be Capable of Empathy?, TOWARDS DATA SCI.
(Sept. 21, 2019), https://towardsdatascience.com/will-machines-ever-be-capable-ofempathy-d5c929ffc0a4.
192 See Tegmark, supra note 188.
193 See id.
194 See, e.g., THE JAG LEGAL CTR. & SCH., supra note 18.
195 Fontaine, supra note 191.
196 Id.
197 Garry Kasparov, Intelligent Machines Will Teach Us-Not Replace Us, WALL STREET
J. (May 7, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/intelligent-machines-will-teach-usnotreplace-us-1525704147 (“We’re not being replaced by AI. We’re being promoted.”).
198 Fontaine, supra note 191.
199 See, e.g., THE JAG LEGAL CTR. & SCH., supra note 18.
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A. Cognitive Liberty.
Cognitive liberty is the concept that humans should be entitled to make free
and competent decisions with respect to the use of technology that affects their
thoughts, and it should only be applied with the consent of the subject using
them. 200 Some argue this goes as far as being a basic human right. 201 The advent
of technologies that impact the neurological process and manipulate thought has
produced a body of academic work that advocates for the idea that thought
intrusion should be strictly off-limits. 202 Fear of judgment or punishment for
thought is the crux of this concept. 203 Indeed, there is legal tradition in protecting
thought itself from use and judgment against an actor without positive action. 204
Thought itself cannot be the avenue by which a person is held accountable for a
crime or other forms of liability. 205 The ambiguity of what signals are displayed
may produce only a correlation, but in legal regimes where life, liberty, or
property may be deprived, based upon judgment of the signals, the tradeoffs of
what the technology offers may not be worth the cost.
As we have seen above, LOAC does not find intuition to be a violation
itself. 206 To hold commanders accountable, legal regimes must ensure the
thoughts and actions of commanders are their own. 207 If not, the failure of
maintaining cognitive liberty may present a fundamental defense that
neurological interference occurred, thus making it impossible to hold
commanders responsible for their failure in preventing and addressing actions
imparted on them or their subordinates.
B. Jurisdiction of the Mind.
Jurisdiction of the mind is a step further from cognitive liberty; it advocates

200 See Marcello Ienca, Preserving the Right to Cognitive Liberty, SCIENTIFIC AM. (Aug.
1, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/preserving-the-right-to-cognitiveliberty/; Justin Koplow, Three Thoughts on Privacy in the Coming Era of Brain-Computer
Interface, SMU SCI. & TECH L. REV. BLOG (2020), https://smulawjournals.org/
stlr/2020/04/01/three-thoughts-on-privacy-in-the-coming-era-of-brain-computer-interface/.
201 See Ienca, supra note 200.
202 See Kraft & Giordano, supra note 183.
203 See id. at 3.
204 See id. at 2.
205 See ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 823; see also Bathaee, supra note 12, at 890.
206 Wallach & Marcus, supra note 66; SOLIS, supra note 15, at 418; see also Vetter,
supra note 59, at 92–93 (explaining how a leader might insulate himself from potential
violations and criminal culpability).
207 See SOLIS, supra note 15, at 418; see also TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 15, at
396-399 nn. 955, 960–61; see also Buchan & Tsagourias, supra note 16, at 670.
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that the point of decision should remain exclusively that of the thinker. 208 Recall
that liability and accountability regimes require both thought and positive
action—both must be voluntary. 209 If such positive action does not connect to
thought, liability cannot be proven. 210
Contemporary concerns and principles of cybersecurity are present here. As
discussed above, cybersecurity seeks to prevent or mitigate unauthorized access
and use of network resources, here, brain signals. 211 Widespread adoption of
BCI must ensure that outside actors cannot interfere or dictate action in the same
way that AI and ML would do so internally to a BCI system. In other words,
addressing the vulnerabilities of a system that outside actors may exploit is an
ongoing practice. 212 The potential for neurological penetration in the form of
hacking is raised certain degrees in armed conflict, especially with sophisticated
state actors with assets that could achieve such feats. 213 Given the presence of a
variety of information operations, electromagnetic operations, and cyberspace
operations, exploitation of BCI technologies would be a fundamental aspect of
tactical doctrine to use against another state to achieve the objective of
presenting an adversary as illegitimate due to violations of international law. 214
To ensure and discern true violations from those which are manipulated,
efforts must be made to produce technologies with sound cybersecurity practices
that prevent the hacking of the mind.
C. Ethical Algorithms and Digital Architecture.
Algorithms are sets of instructions sent to or embedded within a computer
with inputs and outputs. 215 Although inputs and outputs occur through the
208 See Kraft & Giordano, supra note 183 (referencing several Supreme Court cases that
reinforce the concept that “citizens should be generally free from intrusion into one’s
privacy and control of one’s thoughts”).
209 See ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 823; see also Bathaee, supra note 12, at 891–92
(noting that intent and causation are fundamental doctrines in American law).
210 See ALEXANDER, supra note 7, at 815; see also Bathaee, supra note 12, at 892–93
(noting the evidence that is used to determine an individual’s thought process behind a given
crime).
211 See Ali, supra note 102, at 17–18.
212 See Robin Harris, Hacking Brain-Computer Interfaces, ZDNET (Feb. 17, 2020),
https://www.zdnet.com/article/hacking-brain-computer-interfaces/ (discussing how
individuals can hack a BCI and the dangers it poses).
213 See OFF. OF DIR. OF NAT’L INTEL., WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE US
INTEL. CMTY. 15–16 (2019).
214 See ANDREW FEICKERT ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45392, U.S. GROUND
FORCES ROBOTICS AND AUTONOMOUS SYS. (RAS) AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE:
CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONG. 29 (2018).; see also Blythe & Calhoun, supra note 24, at 41–42
(noting that competitors weaponize technology to benefit them and further their agendas).
215 KEARNS & ROTH, supra note 98, at 4 (“[A]n algorithm is nothing more than a very
precisely specified series of instructions for performing some concrete task.”); WEST &
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acquisition and processing of brain signals, BCI is no different. 216 To ensure
legal sufficiency, they must be developed in a way to ensure compliance with
international law. 217 For respondeat superior, such technologies must provide a
way to discern where thought has been manipulated, and/or where commanders
(or overseers and other superiors) can prevent manipulation or identify where it
has occurred. 218 This can be achieved through international weapons review,
sound auditing, and the ability to program and use BCI in an ethical manner. 219
The weapons review process ensures that technologies such as BCI will not
present a situation where the technology cannot be controlled, thus violating
international legal regimes. 220 Auditing will allow parties to examine the
ambiguity of such technologies, such as artificial and machine learning, to figure
out why certain actions were taken from thought to positive action. 221 Sound
ethical practice will ensure that reckless programming is prevented and does
cross the threshold to criminality.
Regarding digital architecture and the control of artificial intelligence, one
scholar notes several ways this can be achieved through methods. Some
examples include “Boxing,” “Incentives,” “Stunting,” and “Tripwires.” 222 First,
Boxing confines a system in such a way that it can only affect the external world
through restricted, pre-approved channels. 223 Second, Incentives—allows
integration into a wider world through its actions that improve human safety and
benefit. 224 Third, Stunting constrains a system’s cognitive capabilities or its
ability to affect key internal processes. 225 Lastly, Tripwires perform diagnostics
on a system with a mechanism to shut it down when dangerous activity is
detected. 226 Each of these systems seek to address the looming problem of
ALLEN, supra note 98, at 221 (defining algorithms as “a sequence of instructions telling a
computer what to do”).
216 See supra Part III.
217 Gary Corn, Cyber Operations and the Imperfect Art of “Translating” the Law of War
to New Technologies, LIEBER INST., U.S. MIL. ACAD. WEST POINT (Sept. 3, 2020),
https://lieber.westpoint.edu/cyber-operations-imperfect-translating-law-war-new/.
218 See WEST & ALLEN, supra note 98, at 174 (noting the concern that as technology
advances, and is used more frequently across the world, there is a growing accountability
concern for when undesirable outcomes result from the use of such technology).
219 See id. at 183–84, 197 (proposing ways to regulate new and innovate technology, like
AI, so that it is a benefit to society rather than a liability).
220 See id. at 217 (emphasizing the need for human control over evolving and advanced
technology).
221 Id. at 183–84.
222 BOSTROM, supra note 167, at 155–76.
223 Id. at 155–58
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Id. (arguing that “endowing a superintelligence with an agent-like structure can be a
way of increasing predictability and transparency”).
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control between agent (BCI system) and principle (human), and the capabilities
that a system holds which may overpower or manipulate human operators with
its superior intelligence. 227 Each come with its own drawbacks, such as a system
manipulating an actor into believing it is under control or augmenting other
technologies available to overcome limitations. 228 However, these
recommendations offer a technical start to the conversation of limiting the
capability of a system to overpower a human operator and dictating decisions
that the operator would not have made otherwise by addressing the underlying
process in which they make decisions.
VIII. CONCLUSION.
Respondeat superior ensures commanders exercise their authority to prevent
violations of LOAC. 229 If they are shown to have a superior-subordinate
relationship—effective control of subordinates—and information that allows
them to prevent violations or hold those who violate LOAC in which they fail to
do so, culpability is imparted on them. 230 BCI disrupts this legal regime, in that
the algorithm used by a BCI device may serve as a true superior who dictates
action of a commander. 231 It may also impact effective control and the
information available to prevent or hold those accountable for LOAC
violations. 232 International legal regimes requiring mitigation of the destructive
results of conflict may not be adequate to address the emergence of a technology
such as BCI. 233
The shared human experience of survivability and empathy cannot be
encapsulated by BCI’s technology if limitations are not present. 234 New ideas
such as the liberty to keep thoughts private, the ability to maintain control over
thought and action, and ethical algorithm design and architecture may present
solutions. 235 If not, whether armed conflict remains a human endeavor may be
227 Id. at 158 (noting which AI system may be the safest option and least likely to corrupt
or manipulate the human in control).
228 Id. at 156–57.
229 See Bathaee, supra note 12, at 934 (explaining the doctrine of respondeat superior).
230 Wallach & Marcus, supra note 66; see SOLIS, supra note 15, at 418; Vetter, supra
note 59, at 92–93.
231 BOSTROM, supra note 167, at 155–58 (noting which AI system may be the safest
option and least likely to corrupt or manipulate the human in control due to an agency-like
structure being implemented).
232 Id. at 158 (noting than an “Oracle AI system” may corrupt the human in control).
233 See Ali, supra note 19, at 42–43 (suggesting certain developments that could defend
against advanced technological attacks).
234 See supra Part V.
235 See Kraft & Giordano, supra note 183, at 1–2 (referencing several Supreme Court
cases that reinforce the concept that “citizens should be generally free from intrusion into
one’s privacy and control of one’s thoughts”).
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questionable. 236 The decision remains within the control of humanity as to what
path we choose to take in the evolution of technologies such as BCI. The choices
made now will undoubtedly affect the way in which accountability is interpreted
under international law.

236 See Ali, supra note 19, at 5–6 (noting that developments in technology and
cyberwarfare could impact tactical decisions in whether or not to engage in armed conflict
because doing so no longer comports with the principle of “proportionality”).

